Range @range_org

Book a demo to see how we can support your token or operations 👇 range.org/contact?utm_so…

Operating under a partner's license can remove a lot of compliance work. That doesn't mean your own wallets are continuously monitored. A wallet screened once at deposit and never checked again is operating on an increasingly outdated risk decision.

range.org/contact

Day 1 of @Sibos is today! Range is in Miami through Thursday with @aesmonty and @VincentKokshrn. Banks, custodians, exchanges and stablecoins all in the same operation, but still no single view of the money? Come talk to us. Reply or DM.

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A useful test for an AI feature: can it change anything? Summarizing a dashboard speeds up retrieval, but the system is still read-only. Range Command answers questions from your treasury data and can update workspace settings on request. See it live 👇 range.org/get-in-touch?u…

"Design early" @rynesaxe's advice to institutions going onchain: roughly a year of solutions engineering sits between appetite and a working use case, and the demand drivers are already in the market. @eco's advice: get product and business aligned early. If onchain payments are on your roadmap, this is worth a minute.

Without direct onboarding by the issuer, the onchain address must carry the evidence. @onrefinance is licensed to accept digital assets as collateral for writing reinsurance. Investors take that exposure through ONyc, a yield-bearing dollar asset issued on @solana that combines reinsurance premium income with collateral returns. Bought directly from OnRe, it is a regulated product backed by a KYC'd counterparty. ONyc also circulates on third-party venues, is used as collateral on @kamino and @Loopscale and is pooled on @orca_so and @Raydium. A secondary purchase on one of those venues is not an issuance by OnRe and does not give the buyer a right against OnRe. So the wallet itself needs to be assessed. Range's Risk API can screen it before it transacts, returning a risk score from 1 to 10, the reason behind it, the underlying evidence and its distance from known malicious activity. The same screen covers existing holders. For unusually large deposits, a brief hold adds a second layer, because labeling an address caught in a live exploit takes hours rather than seconds. If you are opening a permissionless entry point, screening must happen before the first purchase clears. Read the case study 👇 range.org/blog/onyc-real…

Why is institutional capital still sitting offchain? Eco CEO @rynesaxe joined @range_org for a fireside and talked about the gap desks hit once they come onchain.

Range @range_org

6 days ago

When a dollar isn't a dollar: routing stablecoins across chains | Fireside with @rynesaxe Co-founder & CEO at @eco x.com/i/broadcasts/1…

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Range Riserva comes to Lisbon on 5 October, the night before @FintechMeetup @aesmonty and the Range team are hosting an evening over three wines with 40 people across fintech and stablecoins. Spots are limited. RSVP 👇 luma.com/nl90gpxt?utm_s…

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Find us in Zurich next week. We'll be at CV Summit with @CV_Labs, 29-30 September. @maxrobot5, our Head of Product, is on the wallets panel: crypto holders to stablecoin payments. Wednesday, 13:15, Catalyst Stage. Going too? Reply or DM, and we'll sort a time to talk.

Eco had traction with its consumer app. Then, after FTX, its bank partners began withdrawing support one by one. @rynesaxe on the hardest decision he made: shutting it down and rebuilding @eco as stablecoin routing infrastructure. On Range Fireside. Listen 👇

The email was real. The request was not. Revolut disclosed customer data after receiving fraudulent requests from an address on a genuine government agency domain. The communication carried valid domain authentication credentials. Days earlier, Trezor and BitBox subscribers received phishing emails through the vendors' real mailing infrastructure after a compromise at Brevo. The incidents are not connected, but the weakness is similar: the attacker did not need to spoof the channel. They accessed a channel people already trusted. That matters for payments too. A payment instruction can come from the right address, in the right thread, against a real invoice, and still be fraudulent. For stablecoins, once it settles, there may be nothing to reverse. The control cannot sit at the communication layer, because that layer is what the attacker already holds. Where it has to sit instead 👇 range.org/blog/what-happ…

Every auditor asks a privacy protocol the same question: what stops a sanctioned address from getting in? Most compliance tooling in crypto assumes the transaction graph is readable. Screen the counterparty, trace the funds, flag the pattern. A privacy protocol removes that assumption by design. Once the transaction interior is confidential, that interior is no longer available to screen, and no amount of tooling reconstructs it afterward. That leaves one usable decision point, before the privacy layer applies. Assess the address and the transfer there, or do not assess them at all. That turns it into an architecture decision, with the audit as the deadline. Screening built into the program before review becomes part of the audited code. Adding it later can mean another review, a migration and months of answering diligence questions with “not yet.” @cloak_ag, private financial infrastructure on Solana, built theirs the first way. Range's Risk API runs at the perimeter of their product, inside the program that went to audit. How it works 👇 range.org/blog/how-cloak…

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Tomorrow morning in Paris @maxrobot5 and @0xNora_ are joining finance and treasury teams from @herclegroup, @utila_io and @zama for a closed-door breakfast on moving corporate cash onchain. They’ll be around afterwards. Reply or DM if you’re in town.

When a dollar isn't a dollar: routing stablecoins across chains | Fireside with @rynesaxe Co-founder & CEO at @eco x.com/i/broadcasts/1…