c-node @colludingnode

nullifier pruner & transaction aggregator @ https://t.co/E6ZRLE9LeX | opinions are my own cnode.phd ironwood pool Joined October 2021

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c-node @colludingnode

a hour ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia @RockRockenhaus - spy node block explorers applies to monero too, Chainalysis admits to running them on xmr - encrypted memos are optional and not a privacy issue you realize none of these are actual backdoors?

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c-node @colludingnode

a hour ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia @RockRockenhaus - timing analysis can be prevented by improving opsec, which makes it a shitty backdoor, and one that Monero is equally (if not more) vulnerable. - Near intents is optional and the issue you mention has been fixed (why would the feds allow an intentional backdoor to be fixed?)

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c-node @colludingnode

a hour ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia you're right, we can't prove that less than 406k ZEC were stolen. there is a chance that some amount < 406k ZEC will turn out to have been stolen. that number decreases every day.

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

@CryptoCyberia Oh, and an important detail: your next argument might be that there is something untrustworhy about the curves used in Orchard (called the Pasta curves) Well, it turns out, even if there is something wrong with the curves, that wouldn't affect the privacy properties of Halo!

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia actually, the amount must be less than 406k ZEC, and this number decreases every day an attacker has no way of knowing how many users forgot their wallets you speak about things you do not understand

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@_TomHoward @Vladfdp a Monero bro was about to show me an attack on Pedersen commitments right before he OD'd on fent

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia not to mention, it would have to have been completely offset by funds lost by users, or else we'd have a blocked exit on the turnstile you understand that, right?

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia this is your fud? like okay lol Monero wallet drains and darknet scams add up to more than that

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia @RockRockenhaus if they can hide backdoors in an open source repo like Zcash, then why'd they demand he install a backdoor on his individual node? you are making the opposite of the point you think you are

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia you're now arguing that a hacker stole a tiny and inconsequential amount of ZEC?

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c-node @colludingnode

2 hours ago

@kucoincat what part of the protocol do you think has a backdoor?

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c-node @colludingnode

3 hours ago

@kucoincat @CryptoCyberia It’s up to individual users to migrate their funds. If they lost their wallet or are too lazy, then they can’t do it. It actually proves the opposite of your point- an exploitation scenario is when we’d be more likely to see the pools zero out.

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c-node @colludingnode

3 hours ago

It’s true

Vlad v/acc @Vladfdp

4 hours ago

Guys if you ever wanna talk to @colludingnode DO NOT REACH OUT DIRECTLY he might not answer It’s actually way more efficient to publicly tweet about zcash being backdoored He will immediately answer to offer to get on a call with you to go through the code Wayyy easier

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

@CryptoCyberia we are now debating the rigorous proof presented on page 24 of this paper. Find an error, or admit your'e talking out your ass. eprint.iacr.org/2019/1021

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

@CryptoCyberia the darkweb used to run on bitcoin

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

criminals use bitcoin for crime all the time. their standard is as low as "slightly better than bitcoin", you are not making a great case for XMR with that point. never said i knew it all by heart if there's a backdoor in libsignal's chacha, that would affect much more than just ZCash, things you trust would be in the blast radius as well so we're back to your thinking there's a privacy backdoor in Halo. Can you find any cryptographer in the world who has raised an eyebrow over Halo's PSHVZK argument?

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

it's a decentralized protocol with many independent orgs contributing. Matthew Green and Zooko are just two individuals. their past comments don't mean anything. They didn't invent Orchard or Halo. if i start contributing bug fixes to Monero and then i say something retarded, that shouldn't reflect negatively on the protocol. There is no possibility of a deliberately inserted privacy backdoor in the protocol. "It's a complex architecture", well I just spoonfed you the resources to understand it, so it sounds like a skill issue.

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

"the encryption" is chacha, imported from libsignal, and soon (with the Tachyon upgrade) won't even be mandatory to use, allowing users to swap it out for whatever they trust- thus far, no feds have tried to stop us from developing it. your earlier claim was not about the encryption, it was about the ZKPs. I'm so glad you asked, it's fun to explain You can start with my blog post here, where i attempt to demystify the formal definition of zero-knowledge, feel free to keep asking me questions until you are convinced. cnode.phd/demystifying_f…

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c-node @colludingnode

4 hours ago

You have yet to address that Kraken (beloved by regulators) lists Monero in the United States. Okay great, let's dive into the rigorous proof of Halo's zero-knowledge property. Remember, you are now arguing that it's possible through some mechanism to recover a user's secret witness from the pallas points and scalar field elements comprising this 5kB value: x.com/colludingnode/…

c-node @colludingnode

4 days ago

@CryptoCyberia "decrypt the ZKPs" is not a statement that makes sense. You are implying there exists a way to recover the private witness from the proof data, typically 5 kB mostly comprised of Vesta curve points and Vesta scalar field elements. Mathematical proof of this infeasibility are